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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict finding Appellant 
guilty of disorderly conduct contrary to Logan City 
Ordinance 12/8/9. The appeal is taken to the Utah Court of 
Appeals from the Second Circuit Court, Cache County, Logan 
City Department pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure title 77, chapter 35. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1) Whether or not Logan City Ordinance 12/8/9 
violates Article 1 § 15 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah and the First Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States of America. 
2) Whether or not Logan City Ordinance 12/8/9 is 
unconstitutional vague as applied. 
3) Whether or not the Court properly and adequately 
instructed the jury. 
4) Whether or not the Court in admonishing the 
Appellant before the jury committed harmless error. 
i 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 11, 1988 at approximately 1:30 am (T.25 In 
24-35, T. 26 In. 1-5), officers observed a small car make a 
wide turn and start to side slip in some small pea gravel 
then accelerate very rapidly to a speed extimated to be 
between thirty-five to thirty-eight miles per hour (T.32 In 
4-9). When within a position about ten to fifteen feet in 
front of the police vehicle, the suspect vehicle braked and 
stopped at a traffic semaphore on Third North and Main 
Street in Logan City. The officers pulled their car behind 
the suspect vehicle and followed it through the semaphore. 
At which time, the officers activated their lights and 
suspect vehicle pulled over into a parking lot of a local 
business (T. 27-28). The officers pulled behind the suspect 
vehicle; and the Appellant exited his vehicle and walked up 
to the door of the business. One of the officers called to 
Appellant indicating that they needed to talk with him (T. 
38-39) . Another officer asked how the Appellant was and the 
Appellant responded, "Not very good" (T. 4 0 In A) . The 
officer then inquired what the problem was. The Appellant 
responded, "You guys are on my private property, you have no 
reason for being here, you're trespassing" (T. 40 In 
13-14). Appellant stepped toward the officer and said, "Now 
git". The officer then asked Appellant for his driver's 
o 
license, and Defendant responded, "Fuck you, I'm not going 
to give it to you" (T. 40 In 24-25). All the officer 
wanted was Appellant's drivers license and registration, and 
to talk with him for a minute about his driving. The 
officer was trying to determine if he had been drinking or 
not (T. 41 In 7-11). 
The officer continued to ask for Appellant's license 
with Appellant responding, "Fuck you" and "This is bull-
shit". Appellant continued to refuse to get his drivers 
license. 
The situation got progressively worse and was 
deteriorating. It was becoming a fight (T. 82 In 16-25). 
Appellant was yelling at the officer face-to-face with the 
officer backing away trying to disfuse the situation. 
Appellant was becoming violent. The officer was in danger 
(T. 84 In 9-12) . 
The following is a transcript of part of the con-
versation that ensued between the officers and Appellant 
introduced into evidence at trial as Exhibit D-l (T. 85-93) 
Huber: ... You're two blocks down the road. 
Monroe: We weren't two blocks down the road. 
Huber: You were clear the hell down by Taco Time. 
Monroe: Do you want to know where we really were? When you 
came around the corner, when you came around the 
corner awfully fast, right at the road here, we were 
parked just off the road. But we do need to see 
your driver's license. 
Huber: ...This is my property and your on it without my 
permission and that's it that's what it boils down 
to. If it ... I'm tired of being harrassed. 
Monroe: We need to see your registration too please. 
Huber: Bull shit I How you'r,e on my property this is my 
building, I haven't done anything wrong, I want to 
be left alone. I'm get tired of this harrassment, 
because I come out of my bar and you guys start 
harrassing, and I don't want it. 
Monroe: We need to see your driver's license, and the 
registration. 
Huber: The registration is current it's on the back, 
you're going to run it through the radio, you can 
find out just as quick as I can. 
Monroe: Look, Mr. Huber, we are trying to be decent here. 
Huber: No, you're not, why you pull me over. 
Monroe: As we said, you're going too fast. 
Huber: No it's because, what time is it, because you have 
nothing else to do. And that's it. 
Monroe: In just about 2 seconds, we're not going to be 
decent okay. We need to see the registration. 
Huber: Fine, fine, fine. Get your lights out... 
Monroe: We'll be with you in just a second. 
Huber: This is a bunch of crap, you know the car it it's 
mine, it's always here. Get your fuckin1 light 
out of my car, goddamnit. You guys piss me right 
off. 
Monroe: Here's the deal Mr. Huber, you are under arrest 
for disorderly conduct. We are going to jail. 
Put your hands behind your back. Turn around and 
put your hands behind your back. 
Huber: What is the deal here? 
Monroe: You're under arrest. 
Huber: For what? For what? Hold your horses let me put 
my keys in my pocket. 
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Monroe: Okay we'll do that. 
Huber: ...turn my car off, can I turn my car off. 
Monroe: Not now. 
Huber: Wait a minute, can I call my attorney right now? 
This is stupider than hell. You guys really wanna 
go for this....You wit around there and ... my car 
for no reason what so ever. 
Are they too tight 
That one!s way too tight 
Would you like me to loosen them a little bit for 
ya. 
I'd like not to be wearing them...hello can you 
explain to me why these guys are pulling this 
stunt. 
I don't know yet, but I'll find out. Mr. Huber 
you're under arrest for... 
I'm on my own property, ...I get mad at them 
because...in my car, there is absolutely no reason 
for this... my own private property, this is my 
property, you agree you're on my property he 
knows me personally. 
Roper: I don't know you. 
Huber: Well he does. 
Monroe: Mr. Huber, I've seen you one time okay. (To 
Geier-away from Huber)...he was going 20-25 mph 
going around the corner, visually between 35-38 
mph coming down the road here. He thinks we're 
clear up the road, here, we were sitting right 
here watching the house. He comes around the 
corner visually 35-38 mph we stopped him, he jumps 
out and just goes bananas. Re won't give us the 
drivers license he's telling us, fuck you, goddamn 








Geier: Sounds good to me. 
Monroe: Yea, he's going to jail. 
Geier: Would you like your car left here on your own 
personal property? 
Huber: Yes, I'd like me left here. 
Defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct and 
transported to jail. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. THE LOGAN CITY DISORDERLY CONDUCT ORDINANCE PROPERLY 
CONSTRUED DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I SECTION 15 OF THE 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
2. LOGAN CITY DISORDERLY CONDUCT ORDINANCE IS NOT 
OVERBROAD NOR CONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED 
TO THIS DEFENDANT. 
3. THE JURY WAS PROPERLY AND ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED 
BY THE COURT. 
4. THE COURT PROPERLY CHARGED THE JURY WITH THE 
ELEMENTS OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT. 
5. THE COURT PROPERLY ADMONISHED APPELLANT NOT TO 




THE LOGAN CITY DISORDERLY CONDUCT ORDINANCE 
PROPERLY CONSTRUED DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I 
SECTION 15 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION OR 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The Appellant alleging the unconstitutionality of the 
Logan City Disorderly Conduct Statute must overcome three 
hurdles: 
1) The ordinance is presumed to be valid and 
in conformity with the Constitution. 
Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. 21 Utah 2d 
431, 446 P.2d S58 (1968); Greaves v. State 528 P.2d 805 
(Utah 1974) . 
2) The statute or ordinance should not be 
invalid unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be 
incompatible with some particular constitutional provision 
Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1969). 
3) The burden of showing invalidity of the 
ordinance is upon the Appellant. 
In State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 373, 250 P.2d 
561, 563 (1952), it was recognized 
that statutes should not be declared unconstitutional 
if there is any reasonable basis upon which they may be 
sustained as falling within the constitutional frame-
work, and that a statute will not be held void for 
uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practical effect 
may be given. 
In fact, it is the established policy of the Utah 
Supreme Court to construe statutory provisions whenever 
possible in a way to avoid invalidating them on 
constitutional grounds. Greaves v. State, supra. 
For example, in State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260 
(Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court imposed the requirement 
that juries be instructed to find that previous crimes of 
the defendant which have not resulted in convictions, 
introduced at a penalty phase, be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
In State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83-84 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 459 US 988, 103 S. Ct 341, 74 L. Ed 2d 383 (1982), 
the Utah Supreme Court construed Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended) §76-3-207 to require proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt at the penalty phase of a capital case that the 
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances, even though no specific burden of persuasion 
was provided in the statute. 
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In Re Criminal Investigation, 7th District Court No. 
Cs-1, 754 P.2d 633, 640-41 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme 
Court went to great lengths to save the constitutionality of 
the Subpoena Powers Act by reading into it a host of new 
provisions which simply were next put in by the Legislature. 
However, in Provo City Corporation v. Willden, 100 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7 (1989), the Utah Supreme Court found Provo 
City's soliciting sexual conduct ordinance unconstitutional 
as a violation of the freedom of speech clause of the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court 
noted that the city might have forbid the Defendant's 
conduct therein by a properly worded ordinance. 
In fact, State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280 Utah (1983), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that a Utah statute prohibiting 
production of visual recordings depicting minors engaging in 
sexual or simulated sexual conduct was not subject to attack 
on First Amendment grounds, in that conduct prohibited was 
not pure speech. 
Our fundamental interest in free speech demands the 
existence of a compelling government interest to justify 
legislative restriction upon it. 
For example, in Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent 
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct 733, 21 L. 
Ed 2d 731 (1969) , students wore black armbands to school to 
publicize their objections to the Vietnam War despite the 
fact that they were aware that the school authorities a few 
days previously had adopted a policy or regulation any 
student wearing an armband to school would be asked to 
remove it, and if he refused would be suspended until he 
returned without the armband. The authorities had no reason 
to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would 
substantially interfere with the work of the school or 
impinge upon the rights of other students. It was held that 
the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of the case was 
entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive 
conduct by those participating in it, and as such was 
closely akin to "pure speech" which was entitled to 
protection under the First Amendment. 
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Commonwealth of 
Virginia, 435 US 829, 98 S. Ct 1535, 56 L. Ed 2d 1 (1978) 
held that the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of 
speech and press did not permit the criminal punishment of 
the news media, who were nonparticipants in the commission's 
confidential proceedings. Although the Virginia criminal 
statute did not violate the Constitution, it could not 
constitutionally be extended to punish a newspaper. 
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In Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S. Ct 2023 (1982), the 
ordinance was expressly directed at commercial activity 
promoting or encouraging illegal drug use. If that activity 
is deemed "speech", then it is speech proposing an illegal 
transaction which a government may regulate or ban entirely. 
A compelling government interest has been found to 
exist in the prohibition of fighting words - words which by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace do not enjoy constitutional 
protection. Chaplinsky vs. New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 62 S. 
Ct 766, 86 L. Ed 1031 (1942). 
There are certain well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have 
never been thought to raise any 
constitutional problem. These include 
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the 
libelous, and the insulting or 
'fighting1 words - those which by their 
very utterance induce injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace. 
It has been well observed that such 
utterances are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly out weighed by the 
social interest in order, and morality. 
Chaplinsky, supra at 571-572. 
In order to uphold the constitutionality of a state 
statute or ordinance under which the prosecution attempts to 
punish the utterance of "fighting words", such statute or 
ordinance must, by its own terms or as construed by the 
statefs court, be limited in its application to "fighting 
words" and must not be susceptible of application to speech 
that is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra. 
Affirming the defendant's conviction under a state 
statute prohibiting any person.from addressing "any 
offensive, devisive or annoying words to any other person 
lawfully in any street or other public place, for calling a 
police officer a "Goddamned rackateer" and a "dammed 
fascist", the United States Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, supra, rejected the defendant's contention 
that the statute deprived him of his right of freedom, of 
speech guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Noting 
that the statute, as construed by the state's highest court, 
merely prohibited face-to-face words plainly likely to cause 
a breach of the peace and did not contravene the 
constitutional right of free expression. The statute was 
narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific 
conduct lying within the domain of state power, namely, the 
use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of 
the peace. A statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn 
so as not unduly to impair liberty of expression is not too 
vaque for a criminal law. 
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In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15f 91 S. Ct 1780, 29 
L. Ed 2d 284 (1971) , it was held that merely offensive or 
vulgar language alone could not be punished. In this case, 
the defendant did net engage in nor threaten to engage inf 
nor did anyone as the result of his conduct in fact commit 
or threaten to commit any act of violence. The defendant 
did not make any loud or unusual noise, nor was there any 
evidence that he uttered any sound prior to his arrest, 
Defendant just wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the 
Draft". 
Later, in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 US 518, 92 S. Ct 1103, 
31 L. Ed 2d 4C8 (1972) , the Supreme Court defined the 
necessary characteristics of statutes or ordinances 
proscribing the use of offensive words in public if such 
legislation is to pass constitutional muster. Enactments 
punishing the use of words or language must be carefully 
drawn or authoritatively construed to punish only 
unprotected speech and must not be susceptible of 
application to speech protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Thus, a state's attempt to proscribe behavior amounting 
tc a breach of the peace or disorderly conduct must punish 
"fighting words" and must do so in such a wasy as to avoid 
infringing at the same time upon constitutionally protected 
speech. 
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The important underlying aspect of these cases goes 
really to the function of lav/ in preserving ordered liberty. 
Civilized people refrain from "taking the law into their own 
hands". 
It is a little over a century since men use to carry 
guns constantly because the law did not afford protection. 
In that setting, words directed toward such an armed 
civilianr could well have led to death or serious bodily 
injury. When we undermine the general belief that the law 
will give protection against fighting words and profane and 
abusive language such as the utterances involved in the case 
at hand, we take steps to return to law of jungle. In 
short, we erode public confidence in the law - that subtle 
but indispensable ingredient of ordered liberty. 
In State v. Chima, 23 Utah 2d 360, 463 P. 2d 802 
(1970) , a statute providing that every person who, without 
authority of law, wilfully disturbs or breaks up any 
assembly or meeting, not unlawful in its character, is not 
unconstitutional. The fact that a speaker at a public 
meeting shouted back at defendants did not render 
unconstitutional the application to defendant of the 
statute. In this case, defendants claimed their right of 
free speech took precedence over another's right to free 
assembly. 
14 
The Logan City Disorderly Conduct ordinances provides: 
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(1) He refuses to comply withe the 
lawful order of the police to move from 
a public place, or knowingly creates a 
hazardous or physically offensive 
condition, by any act which serves no 
legitimate purpose; or 
(2) Intending to cause public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or 
recklessy creating a risk thereof: 
(A) Ke engages in fighting or in 
violent, tumultuous, 
or threatening behavior; or 
(B) He makes unreasonable noises 
in a public place; or 
(C) He makes unreasonable noises 
in a private place 
which can be heard in a public 
place; or 
(D) He engages in abuse or obscene 
language or makes obscene gestures in a 
public place; or 
(E) He obstructs vehicular or 
pedestrian traffic. 
(b) "Public place", for the 
purpose of this section, means any place 
to which the public or a substantia] 
group of the public has access and 
includes but is net limited to streets, 
highways, and the common areas of 
schools, hospitals, apartment housesf 
office buildings, transport facilities 
and shops. 
(c) Disorderly conduct is a class 
C misdemeanor if the offense continues 
after a request by a person to desist. 
Otherwise it is an infraction." 
Disorderly conduct as defined by the Ordinance is net 
necessarily verbal alone. However, the information herein 
alleged that Appellant violated the above statute as 
follows: 
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"COUNT 1: That the Defendant did intend 
to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly 
created a risk thereof by engaging in 
abusive cr obscene language cr made 
obscene gestures in a public place." 
The exception to First Amendment protection recogni 
in Chaplinsky, supra, is not limited to words whose mere 
utterance entails a high probability of an outbreak of 
physical violence. It also extends tc the willful use o 
language calculated to offend the sensibilities of an 
unwilling audience. 
I n
 KillJams v. District of Columbia, 419 F. 2d 628, 
646, (CAEC 1969), this issue was explicitly addressed: 
Z^ part from punishing profane or obscene 
words which are spoken in circumstances 
which create a threat of violence, the 
State may also have a legitimate 
interest in stopping one person from 
inflicting injury en others by verbally 
assaulting them with language which is 
grossly offensive because of its profane 
or cbscene character. The fact that a 
person may constitutionally indulge his 
taste for obscenities in private does 
not mean that he is tree to intrude them 
upon the attentions of others. 
...a breach of the peace is threatened 
either because the language creates a 
substantial risk of provoking violence, 
or because it is, under "contemporary 
community standards," so crossly 
offensive to members of the public who 
actually overbear it as to amount to 
nuisance. 
Clearly the Logan City ordinance can be construed a 
constitutional under such reasonmc. 
Furthermore, in the present situation, the Appellant 
was stopped and asked to produce his driver's license (T. 40 
In 22-23). Appellant responded, "Fuck you, Ifm not going to 
give it to you" (T. 40 In 25). Appellant continued yelling 
and shouting at the officers, "Fuck you"; "This is bullshit" 
and the like (T. 41 In. 18). The officer was facing the 
Appellant with the Appellant moving closer to the officer 
and the officer backing away (T. 42 In 3-12). The situation 
was becoming violent and a fight was iminent (T. 84 In 
9-12). 
At the very least, these are fighting words under 
Chaplinsky, supra, especially in light of Appellant's non 
verbal as well as verbal conduct. The conduct of the 
Appellant clearly was not constitutionally protected. 
Furthermore, the actions cf the Appellant clearly were not 
constitutionally protected. 
An ordinance similar to the one herein was fcund tc be 
constitutional in Cottage Grove v. Farr, 42 OR. App. 21, 599 
P. 2d 472 (1979) . The ordinance read in part as fellows: 
"A person commits the crime of dis-
orderly conduct if, with intent to cause 
public convenience, annoyance or alarm, 
he: 
» » * * * 
(c) Uses abusive cr obscene language, 
or makes an obscene gesture, in a public 
place; or 
» * * * 
(h) Created a hazardous or physically 
offensive condition by any act which he 
is not licensed or privileged to do*" 
Id at 473. 
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LOGAN CITY DISORDERLY CONDUCT ORDINANCE IS NOT OVERBROAD NOR 
CONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO THIS DEFENDANT 
In construing the constitutionality of a statute or 
ordinance, a court should construe law so as to carry out 
the legislative intent while avoiding constitutional conflicts. 
In Re A Criminal Investigation Seventh District Court Number 
CS-1, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988) An ordinance or statute will 
net be declared unconstitutional on account of vagueness if 
under any sensible interpretation of its language it can be 
given practical effect. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 803 
(Utah 1974) . 
In ascertaining the constitutionality of a statute cr 
ordinance as previously noted, the following rules cf 
construction should be applied: 
1) A Legislative enactment is presumed to be 
valid and in conformity with the constitution. Trade 
Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. 21 Utah 2d 431, 4 46 
P.2d 958 (1968); Greaves v. State, supra. 
2) The statute or ordinance should not be 
invalid unless it ir shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be 
incompatible with some particular constitutional provision 
Killer v. State, 462 F.2d 421 (Alaska 1969). 
i a 
3) The burden of showing invalidity of an 
ordinance or statute is upon the one who makes the challenge 
Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, supra. 
In State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 373, 250 P.2d 561, 
563 (1952), it was recognized 
that statutes should not be declared unconstitutional 
if there is any reasonable basis upon which they may be 
sustained as falling within the constitutional frame-
work, and that a statute will not be held void for 
uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practical effect 
may be given. 
In determining whether or not a statute or ordinance is 
vague, it must be sufficiently definite 
(1) To inform persons of ordinary intelligence, 
who would be law abiding, what their conduct must be to 
conform to its requirements, 
(2) To advise a defendant accused of violating it 
just what constitutes the offense with which he or she is 
charged, and 
(3) To be susceptible of uniform interpretation 
and application by those charged with responsibility of 
apply and enforcing it. State v. Packard, supra, Greaves v. 
State, supra, State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182 (Utah, 1981). 
On the other hand, a criminal statute is not rendered 
unconstitutional by the fact that its application may be 
uncertain in exceptional cases, so long as the general area 
of conduct against which legislation is directed is made 
plain. See 21 Am Jur. 2d, Criminal Law §17. 
The ordinance herein states with sufficient clarity and 
conciseness the elements necessary to constitute a 
violation: 
1) a defendant refuses to comply with the lawful 
order of the police to move from a public place, or knowing-
ly creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition, by 
any act which serves no legitimate purpose; or 
2) Defendant intends to cause a public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm or recklessly creates a 
risk thereof: 
a) engages in fighting or in violent, 
tumultuous or threatening behavior; or 
b) makes unreasonable noises in a public 
place; or 
c) engages in abusive or obscene language 
or makes obscene gestures in a public place• 
Taking all the elements into account, the crime specific-
ally defines the outer permieters of conduct. In order to 
violate the ordinance, the above elements must exist. 
In Cottage Grove v. Farr, 42 Or. App. 21, 599 P.2d 472, 
473 (1979) , a local ordinance similar to the ordinance in 
question declaring that 
"A person commits the crime of dis-
orderly conduct if, v/ith intent to cause 
public convenience, annoyance or alarm, 
he: 
« * * * 
(c) Uses abusive or obscene language, 
or makes an obscene gesture, in a public 
place; or 
" * * * 
(h) Created a hazardous or physically 
offensive condition by any act which he 
is not licensed or privileged to do." 
was found to be constitutional. 
I n
 State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 50 (Utah 1982) the Utah 
Supreme Court found the Utah Statute prohibiting interfering 
with a public servant (Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amend-
ed) §76-8-301) not to be unconstitutionally vague. In this 
case, defendant was stopped at a road block and requested to 
produce his driver's license and vehicle registration. 
Defendant angrily asked why he had to go through the process 
because he had been stopped earlier that day. Defendant 
flashed the requested document at the officer, but the 
officer was unable to adequately review the documents so he 
then asked to see them again. Defendant refused, and 
defendant was then ordered cut of his truck. Defendant got 
out and clenching his fists, made threatening moves toward 
the officer. Defendant was arrested then for interfering 
with a public servant. 
Affirming defendant's conviction under a state statute 
prohibiting any person from addressing "any offensive, 
devisive or annoying words to any other person lawfully in 
any street or public place", for calling a police officer a 
"God damned racketeer" and a "damned fascist", the United 
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States Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 
563, 62 S. Ct 166r 86 L. Ed 1033,(1042), rejected the 
defendant's argument that the statute was so vague and 
indefinite as to render a conviction thereunder a violation 
of due process. The Court said that the statute was narrow-
ly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct 
lying within the domain of state power, namely, the use in a 
public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace, 
A statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn so as not 
unduly impair liberty of expression is not too vague for a 
criminal law. 
Now look at the facts of the cases cited by Appellant 
in support of his argument. 
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130, 93 S. Ct 
970, 39 L. Ed 2d 214 (1974) held an ordinance unconstituton-
al that made it unlawful as a breach of the peace "for any 
person wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or 
opprobrious language toward or with reference to " a city 
policemen while in the actual performance of his duties. It 
was held unconstitutional where the state courts had not 
construed the statute as being limited to "fighting words" 
which by their very utterance narrowly defined the words of 
the ordinance so as to limit its application to "fighting 
words". Arguably the statute would have been 
constitutionally upheld if the state courts had construed 
the statutes as being limited to "fighting words". 
Oratowski v. Civil Service Commission of City of 
Chicago, 3 111 App. 2d 551, 123 N.E. 2d 146 (1954), involved 
an administrative review of a police officer's action when 
after being called an "ignorant jerk" because a squad car 
was parked in a no parking zone, the officer arrested a 
indignant motorist who had just received a ticket for 
illegal parking for disorderly conduct. There was consider-
able evidence of physical injury to the motorist in the 
course of the arrest. This was probably been why the court 
noted that "an officer of the law must exercise the greatest 
degree of restraint in dealing with the public. He must not 
conceive that every threatening or insulting word, gesture, 
or motion amounts to disorderly conduct." Oratowski, supra, 
at 151. The present case is a criminal case not an 
administrative case, and there is no evidence of physical 
injury to the Appellant as e result of the arrest. 
In State v. John W, 418 A2d 1097, 14 ALR 4th 1238 (Me. 
1980), the defendant screamed at the officer, "Hey, turn 
around and come back here" and "Hey, you fucking pig, ycu 
fucking kangaroo." The officer then ordered defendant to 
get back into his car. Defendant yelled, "Fuck you". Then 
defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct. This case 
involved no face-to-face confrontation and only verbal 
conduct. 
In fact, the court noted in State v. John W, supra at 
1245 that the United States Supreme Court in Chaplinsky, 
supra, contemplated 
"That courts enforcing disorderly 
conduct statutes must look at the actual 
situation in which the words were used, 
in order to punish only words which, 
when they were used were fplainly 
likely1 to cause a breach of the peace. 
In particular, the fact finder must 
consider those personal attributes of 
the addressee which reasonable apparent 
because those attributes are a part of 
the objective situation in which the 
conduct occurred (emphasis added). 
Norwell v. Cincinnati, 414 US 14, 94 S. Ct 187, 38 L. 
Ed 2d 170, (1973) held application of the disorderly 
conduct ordinance violated Defendant's constitutionally 
protected right of speech because he had been arrested and 
convicted merely because of his verbal protest of the 
officer's treatment of him and not because of his physical 
acts. 
Finally, Papish v. The Board of Curators of the Uni-
versity of Missouri, et al 410 US 667, 93 S. Ct 1197, 35 L. 
Ed 2d 618, ren den 411 US 960, 93 S. Ct 1921, 36 L. Ed 2d 
419, (1973) involved the dismissal of a student by a 
university which is not the case herein. 
As Justice Jackson dissenting in Saia v. New York, 334 
US 558 571, 68 S. Ct 1148, 92 L. Ed 1574, (1948) warned of 
the pitfalls of the kind of constitutional analysis Appe-
llant is requesting herein 
O A 
But I did not suppose our function was 
that of a council of revision. The 
issue before us is whether what has been 
done has deprived this appellant of a 
constitutional right* It is the law as 
applied that we review, not the ab-
stract , academic questions which it 
might raise in some more doubtful case. 
(Emphasis added) 
In the instance case, the officer stopped Appellant 
based upon their observation of a vehicle making a wide 
turn, getting into some small pea gravel and starting to 
slide along with rapid accelaration (T. 28 In 1-8). The 
officers were working on a specific detail, alcohol enforce-
ment (T. 41 In 9-11). 
The Appellant was stopped and asked to produce his 
driver's license (T. 40 In 22-23). Appellant responded, 
"Fuck you, I'm not going to give it to you" (T. 40 In 25). 
Appellant continued yelling and shouting at the officers, 
"Fuck you"; "This is bullshit" and the like (T. 41 In. 18). 
The officer was facing the Appellant with the Appellant 
moving closer to the officer and the officer backing away 
(T. 42 In 3-12). Much of the conversation was recorded and 
is contined herein in the Statement of Facts. But just as 
important as the language of "Fuck you", "Bullshit", "God-
damn", "Hell" and "Piss me off" (T. 97-100), is the manner 
in which Appellant spoke the words and his conduct. Officer 
Monroe testified that the situation was becoming so violent, 
he felt that there was going to be a fight. Officer Roper 
was in danger (T. 84 In 9-12). In addition there is 
reference to Appellant clenching his fists and struggling 
until the handcuffs were put on him (T. 115 In 20-25 to T. 
116 In 1-3)• 
In light of the facts herein, Logan City Disorderly 
Conduct Ordinance is not overbroad nor unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to Appellant. 
3 
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY AND 
ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED BY THE COURT 
Appellant in his brief cites no authority for the 
proposition that the Court was bound upon giving jury 
instruction number 2 or 3 to modify or explain the instruc-
tion in light of the requrired elements of "fighting words" 
and "clear and present danger". 
Furthermore, any error that may have occurred by 
failure of the Court to explain fighting words and clear and 
present danger was harmless error in light of the facts of 
this case. See cases on harmless error set forth in point 5 
below. 
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In the instance case, the officer stopped Appellant 
based upon their observation of a vehicle making a wide 
turn, getting into some small pea gravel and starting to 
slide along with rapid accelaration (T. 28 In 1-8). The 
officers were working on a specific detail, alcohol enforce-
ment (T. 41 In 9-11). 
The Appellant was stopped and asked to produce his 
driver's license (T. 40 In 22-23)• Appellant responded, 
"Fuck you, I'm not going to give it to you" (T. 40 In 25). 
Appellant continued yelling and shouting at the officers, 
"Fuck you"; "This is bullshit" and the like (T. 41 In. 18). 
The officer was facing the Appellant with the Appellant 
moving closer to the officer and the officer backing away 
(T. 42 In 3-12) . Much of the conversation was recorded and 
is contined herein in the Statement of Facts. But just as 
important as the language of "Fuck you", "Bullshit", "God-
damn", "Hell" and "Piss me off" (T. 97-100), is the manner 
in which Appellant spoke the words and his conduct. Officer 
Monroe testified that the situation was becoming so violent, 
he felt that there was going to be a fight, Officer Roper 
was in danger (T. 84 In 9-12). In addition there is 
reference to Appellant clenching his fists and struggling 
until the handcuffs were put on him (T. 115 In 20-25 to T. 
116 In 1-3). 
Appellant's words were definitely fighting words as 
defined in Chaplinskyf supra - words which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of peace, and there was a clear and present danger to 
officer Roper, 
4 
THE COURT PROPERLY CHARGED THE JURY WITH 
THE ELEMENTS OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT 
Jury Instruction number 3 upon Appellant's timely 
objection was amended by the Court to delete that portion 
that dealt with obscene gestures to conform with the evi-
dence (T. 155 In 18-21) and the jury was left to decide the 
issue (T* 156 In 15-16). 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-35-4 provides that an 
information shall set forth the offense "by using the name 
given to the offense by common law or by statutes by stating 
in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to 
give the defendant notice of the charge". 
Any error that may have occurred by surplus verbage 
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from the ordinance contained in the instruction was harmless 
error. See cases on harmless error set forth in Point 5, 
below. 
There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
have found the Defendant guilty of disorderly conduct. 
There was a face-to-face confrontation with Appellant 
yelling and shouting "fuck you", "bullshit", "Goddamn", 
"Hell" and "piss me off" at the officer. The officer was 
backing up to diffuse the situation (T. 92-100). As officer 
Monroe testified, it was becoming violent and he believed 
there was going to be a fight (T. 84 In 9-12) 
5 
COURT PROPERLY ADMONISHED APPELLANT NOT TO 
MAKE GESTURES IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY 
In the present case, the following exchange took place 
(T.61 In 8 to 62 In 5): 
"Mr. Huber: I'm having a hard time swallowing 
this 
Mr. Brady: Maybe he needs a drink. 
The Court: Well, I realize that, but I'm 
admonishing you, Mr. Huber, to not 
make any gestures in the presence 
of this jury. 
OQ 
Mr. Huber: Okay. I'm sorry, your Honor 
The Court: You'll have your chance to testify 
when your turn comes, and I don't 
want you to shake your head one way 
or another. Just sit there and 
listen to the— 
Mr. Lauritzen: Well, I object to that, your Honor. 
He can certainly do that, that's 
not testimony. 
The Court: He's not going to do it in my 
Court, Mr. Lauritzen I want you to 
understand that. 
Mr. Lauritzen: Well, I continue my objection, 
because I can't believe— 
The Court: You may have your objection. You 
may proceed. 
Mr. Lauritzen: Thank You." 
Any prejudice that may have occurred was due to Ap-
pellant's own gestures and words, "I'm having a hard time 
swallowing this," not the action of the Court nor the 
prosecutor. In order to assure a fair trial, the Court 
propertly admonished the Appellant not to make any more 
gestures in the presence of the Jury. 
If any error occurred by such admonition, it was 
corrected by Jury Instruction 14 providing as follows: 
If during the trial the Court has said 
or done anything which has suggested to 
you that it is inclined to favor the 
claims or position of either party, you 
will not permit yourselves to be 
influenced by any such suggestion. 
The Court has not intended to 
indicate any opinion as to which wit-
nesses are, or are not, worthy of 
belief, nor which party should prevail. 
If any expression has seemed to indicate 
an opinion relating to any of these 
matters, you should disregard it, 
because you are the exclusive judges of 
the facts. 
At the very most, said admonition was harmless error. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) Section 
77-35-30 (a) provides " (a)ny error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a 
party shall be disregarded. 
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated, 
(W)e have ruled in several cases that 
Rule 30 phrase "affect the substnatial 
rights of a party" means that an error 
warrants reversal "only if a review of 
the record persuades the Court that 
without the error there was 'a reason-
able likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant.1" Id. at 919. 
The Utah Supreme Court further defined what is meant by 
a "reasonable likelihood." "For an error to require re-
versal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." 
Id. at 920. This is a case of face-to-face confrontation 
with Appellant yelling and shouting "Fuck you", "Bullshit", 
"Goddamn", "Hell" and "Piss me off" at an officer. The 
officer backed up to diffuse the situation (T. 97-100). The 
situation was becoming violent and a fight was imminent (T. 
84 In 9-12). 
Remember, also, the jury found Appellant not guilty of 
speeding (T. 192 In 7-9). 
CONCLUSION 
The Logan City Disorderly Conduct ordinance should be 
construed as not violative of freedom of speech protections 
of the Utah Constitution and United States Constitution. 
Furthermore, the ordinance has been constitutionally applied 
to Appellant under the facts of this case and therefore, 
Appellantfs conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 7 day of July, 1989. 
A D D E N D U M 
12-8-9. Disorderly Conduct. (a) A Person is guilty 
of disorderly conduct if: 
(1) He refuses to comply with the lawful order of the 
police to move from a public place, or knowingly creates a 
hazardous or physically offensive condition, by any act 
which serves no legitimate purpose; or 
(2) Intending to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk 
thereof: 
(A) He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, 
or threatening behavior; or 
(B) He makes unreasonable noises in a public place; or 
(C) He makes unreasonable noises in a private place 
which can be heard in a public place; or 
(D) He engages in abusive or obscene language or makes 
obscene gestures in a public place; or 
(E) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
-3 0 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the | 7 day of July, 1989, I 
mailed 4 true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Respondent's Brief to Arden W. Lauritzen, Attorney for 
Appellant, 326 North First East, P. 0. Box 171, Logan, Utah 
84321. 
Sylvrfa TibbitTs 
Secretary to Logan City 
Prosecutor 
34 
